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Abstract—Fully autonomous vehicles are emerging vehicular
technologies that have gained significant attention in todays
research endeavours. Even though it promises to optimize road
safety, the proliferation of wireless and sensor technologies makes
it susceptible to cyber threats thus dawdling its adoption. The
identification of threats and design of apposite security solutions
is therefore pertinent to expedite its adoption. In this paper, we
analyse the security risks of the communication infrastructure
for the fully autonomous vehicle using a subset of the TVRA
methodology by ETSI. We described the model of communication
infrastructure. This model clarifies the potential communication
possibilities of the vehicle. Then we defined the security objectives
and identified threats. Furthermore, we classified risks and
propose countermeasures to facilitate the design of security
solutions. We find that all identified high impact threats emanates
from a particular source and required encryption mechanisms
as countermeasures. Finally, we discovered that all threats due
to an interaction with humans are of serious consequences.
Index Terms—Risk analysis; Autonomous vehicle; TVRA
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous vehicles are vehicular technologies with the
ability to make independent driving decisions. They are
cooperative systems which aim at the optimization of the
road transport systems and road safety [2] and are based
on the following vehicular interactions; vehicle-to-vehicles
(v2v), vehicle-to-infrastructure (v2i) and vehicle-to-other con-
necting technologies (v2x). Research into autonomous vehicle
technology has received significant attention from academia
and automotive industry and also received support from the
government due to its potential benefits [1, 3].
NHTSA [4] defines 5 levels of autonomy to reflect the degree
to which a driver is required to control and monitor road
operations. Levels 0-2 require the driver to absolutely monitor
the roadway situation. Level 3 requires the driver to maintain
alertness to know when to take back control of the vehicle
while in level 4, the driver cedes absolute control of critical
driving functions and road monitoring.
The generation of valuable data and exposure to external
communications makes it susceptible to cyber threats with
life threatening outcomes upon the successful execution of
a malicious threat. Therefore, to expedite the adoption of
this technology, it must be able to maximally guarantee
the security of the driver and passenger. To achieve this,
it is pertinent to identify the likely potential threats to the
autonomous vehicle and then create apposite security solutions
to mitigate threats. In this paper, we develop a model for the
communication infrastructure to envisage likely threats to the
autonomous vehicle and their origin. Then we identified the
threats, conduct a risk analysis study to classify risks so as
to understand the degree of seriousness of a particular threat
and we proposed countermeasures for identify threats using
the TVRA methodology by ETSI [5].
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section II
presents the communication infrastructure of the autonomous
vehicle. In section III, we present our risk analysis study;
we introduce the security environments, security objectives,
identified threats, classify risks and propose countermeasures.
Section IV concludes this paper.
II. MODEL OF COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE
We present a model of the communication infrastructure for
autonomous vehicle in this section. The model encompasses all
potential interactions between the vehicle and other connecting
entities.
P. Kleberger [6] described a communication infrastructure for
a connected car. They divided their model into 2 distinct
domains; the managed infrastructure and the vehicular com-
munication. The managed infrastructure shows all networks
the autonomous vehicle is likely to be connected to while
the vehicle communication shows the communication links
between the vehicle and other entities. Their model describes
the likely connections of an autonomous vehicle therefore we
adapt to their model and include only specific connections.
Fig.1. describes our communication infrastructure model.
In our model, the managed infrastructure includes all networks
the vehicle will be connected to and other ancillary services
that can be provided for the autonomous vehicle. Vehicle
communications shows all form of connections the vehicle
will be exposed to using the DSRC wireless communication
technology [7]. For example, connection to other vehicles
(v2v), to roadside infrastructures (v2i) and other connecting
technologies (v2x) like connecting the vehicle to the network
of a diagnostic repair shop.
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Fig. 1. Model of the Communication Infrastructure
III. RISK ANALYSIS
Having described the model of communication infrastruc-
ture for the autonomous vehicles, we analyse the threats and
vulnerabilities due to automation of critical vehicle functions
and in the communication exchanges between entities in the
communication infrastructure model using the TVRA method-
ology developed by ETSI [5]. Most precisely, we focus on
the basic interactions of the autonomous vehicle as it travels;
the interactions between the vehicle and other vehicles, the
interactions between the vehicle and the road side units and
with the internet domain.
A. TVRA Methodology
TVRA uses the product estimation of the likelihood of
attack and its impact to identify risk due to a particular threat.
We employ a subset of the TVRA methodology in our risk
analysis study for the autonomous vehicle. Fig.2. specifies
the steps we adopted in this study. Furthermore, we modified
the TVRA process to include specific objectives for identified
threats.
1) Target of Evaluation (ToE): the target of evaluation
includes the description of our security environment
which depends on the assets, threat agents and the
assumptions made. We identify 3 potential targets of
evaluation for the purpose of our risk analysis; the
autonomous vehicle, the passenger in the vehicle, and
the road side infrastructures (RSI).
• Assumptions: 1.) There exist a passenger in
the vehicle; 2.) the passenger has at least one
connecting device; 3.) communications within the
target of evaluation boundaries are considered
secured; and 4.) the internet is secured from any
form of direct attack [5].
• System assets: From the communication architec-
ture, we categorise the system assets as: physical,
logical and human. The physical assets include
but not limited to the autonomous vehicle, human
machine interface (HMI), road side units (RSU),
on-board sensor monitor, and the in-vehicle pas-
sengers connecting devices. Logical assets include:
communication protocols, sensor data, vehicle sys-
tem controls and ancillary applications such as the
applications from the automotive company [2, 5].
The human asset considered in this work is the in-
vehicle passenger. While no known work includes
Fig. 2. TVRA Methodology
this consideration, we argue that human assets could
be exploited and used as a means to attack other
valid communicating entities.
• Threat agents: we introduce a threat reference model
to make obvious the source of threat and identify
threat agents. The letters A, B and E in Fig.3 denote
access interfaces. These interfaces are points by
which an adversary can gain entry into the security
environment and compromise a functional entity.
The reference point Ai means that in the vehicle,
there exist a passenger(s) with connecting devices
ranging from (i=1 to n) where n represents the total
number of connecting devices the passenger has
in the vehicle. The threat agents could be internal
or external adversaries who seek an opportunity to
compromise the communication infrastructure via a
valid ToE.
2) Security Objectives We classify the security objectives
as general and specific. General objectives are defined to
specify what security measures needs to exist to assure
security of the evaluated entities while the specific
objectives are defined for specific threats identified so
as to be able to obtain a counter measure that will
mitigate threats to the autonomous and connecting
system. Specific objectives will be listed in tandem
with identified threats.
• General objectives: 1.) communication between ve-
hicle and other communication entities in the secu-
rity environment should be secured; and 2.) during
major operating processes (booting and storage), the
ToE platforms should be secured [2].
To achieve the objectives, we consider the following
security services to allow for a secure communication
[2, 5];
• Confidentiality: This requires only legitimate access
to broadcasted messages.
• Integrity: This requires that message exchange
among authorized entities cannot be altered.
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• Availability: This requires that at all time, autho-
rized entities should never be denied access to
requisite services.
• Privacy: This requires that the personal information
of all human assets are protected from unauthorized
access.
• Authentication: This requires that communicating
entities can be confirmed as authentic.
• Authorization: This requires that only entities with
necessary privileges have access to certain informa-
tion.
• Plausibility: This ensures the veracity of data.
• Non-repudiation: This requires the implementation
of an audit trail to keep track of executed transac-
tions.
3) Threats We categorize the threats identified in this study
as data, logical and human threats. Data threats are
directed towards the identification of the asset and its
location in a ToE environment. Logical threats are a
compromise to the logical assets and directed towards
the exploitation of a device, item or application. Human
threats are threats carried out by authorized entities
or directed to them. Table I summarizes the identified
threats.
4) Risk analysis We obtain the risks for identified threats
using an estimation value of likelihood that an attack
will occur and the impact of the threats to the system.
Risk = Likelihood * Impact (1)
To obtain the likelihood of an attack, we give an attack
potential based on time it will take to plan and launch the
TABLE I
THREATS
Category of
Threat
Type of Threat Action of Attacker Attack Interface Specific Objectives
Data Threat Eavesdropping and Traffic
analysis.
1) Alter data to reveal identify vehicle. 2)
Alter data to reveal identity of passenger.
A, B Deny access of legitimate traffic to unauthorized
entities.
Location Tracking Alter data to reveal location of vehicle A, B Ensure security of network traffic to deny access to
unauthorized entities.
Message Injection 1) Generate and sends false information on
a message.
A, B Deny access to unauthorized entities.
Sensor spoofing 1) Alter data to change the location of
the vehicle. 2) Malicious use of sensors to
generate faulty data
A, B Deny access to unauthorized entities and secure
communication channels.
Replay Resend old or expired message to obtain
network access.
A, B Verification of incoming messages.
Timing Attack Delay sending safety and time critical mes-
sage.
A, B, B on behalf
of E
Ensure data cannot be altered during transmission.
Logical Threat Illusion Attack. Alter sensors to deliver fake messages A, B Validation of sensor data.
Masquerade. 1) Obtain sensitive information by acting
as a legitimate entity 2) Introduce fake
messages into the network by posing as an
authorized entity.
A, B 1) Enforce strict security policies on authentication.
2) For message reliability, ensure its integrity.
Denial of service. 1) Flooding: Overload the network with
spurious information. 2) Spamming: In-
crease transmission latency and use up net-
work bandwidth by sending high volume of
messages intentionally. 3)Blackhole: Drop
re-routing and misdirecting messages in the
network. 4) Jamming: Cause message loss
by intentionally creating interference.
A, B, B on behalf
of E
Deny illegitimate network entry.
RF-Fingerprinting. identify source and location of radio trans-
mission
A, B Ensure that it is very difficult to identify a functional
entity.
Sybil Attack Deliver fake messages by claiming to be
multiple nodes with different identities
A, B Validation of sensor data
Message suppression. Information loss due to intentional message
deletion
A, B Allow access to authorized entities alone and imple-
ment an audit trail to keep track of actions.
Malware. Flash ECU to execute malicious software A, B Secure update of firmware patches.
Repudiation. Deny received or sent transmissions A, B Maintain an audit trail to keep track of executed
actions.
Human Threat Social Engineering At-
tacks (Phishing).
Compromise mobile devices of in-vehicle
passenger
Ai, A, B and B
on behalf of K
Detection and prevention of misbehaving users.
Intrusion attacks. Installation of a compromised device into
the vehicle by the in-vehicle passenger
Ai, A Security policies/standards for external device usage
in-vehicle.
attack, the expertise of the attacker, knowledge, opportu-
nity and the equipment needed to conduct the attack. The
derived value is then mapped to the TVRA vulnerability
rating to determine likelihood of occurrence [8, 9].
The impact reveals the likely consequences to the ToE.
TABLE II
VULNERABILITY RATING AND LIKELIHOOD
Vulnerability
Rating
Likelihood Values
Beyond High Unlikely 1
High
Moderate Possible 2
Basic Likely 3
No-rating
Impact is classified as high (3): threat has serious
consequences. Medium (2): threat cannot be neglected;
and Low (1): likely damage due to threat is low [3].
Risks are classified as minor (1,2,3) meaning the attack
is unlikely, major (4) meaning the attack is likely but
consequence is likely not fatal and critical (6,9) meaning
the risk is should be treated as urgent and appropriate
countermeasures must be developed for them [2, 9]. Fig.
4 details the risk classification of the identified threats.
In Fig. 4, all high impact threats have been classified as
critical risks. These threats are also means by which
other attacks could be mounted on the exposed ToE
interfaces. For example, Illusion attack gives an attacker
an advantage on the road. The attacker suppresses, alters
messages and also communicates false sensor readings
to deceive neighbouring vehicles. With sensor spoofing
an attacker can cause a holistic dysfunction of the
communication infrastructure. GPS time for example is
used for time stamping and synchronizing messages.
However with GPS spoofing, an attacker can impact on
message timing by means of replay attack [2]. Sybil
attack allows for the consumption of network bandwidth
thereby leading to a denial of service attack. The serious
impact of these attacks calls for the development of
urgent and priority countermeasures to mitigate these
threats.
Reference points A, B represent a significant entry point
for malicious users. High impact threats and major risks
Fig. 4. Risk Analysis
also emanate from reference points A, B therefore, we
conclude that the security of devices in the ToE exposed
to reference points A, B would guarantee the overall
security of the autonomous vehicle.
Reference points Ai and A represents a significant entry
point for malicious users. Threats from these reference
points are critical. This shows that a successful exploita-
tion by a human asset has serious consequences on
the communication infrastructure. Reference point Ai
represents the attack interface for the in-vehicle passen-
ger who via spoofing and intrusion attacks compromise
or could be used to compromise the communication
infrastructure.
5) Countermeasure: The countermeasures to specific
threats have been identified in Table III.
The influence of human assets over the communication
infrastructure must be critically considered and
appropriate countermeasures built around intrusion
detection, prevention and encryption mechanisms as
well as strong security policies must be ensured to
prevent and mitigate threats.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described a communication
model for autonomous vehicles and identified threats to
the security of the full autonomous vehicle communication
infrastructure. We conducted a risk analysis study using
the TVRA methodology developed by ETSI and proposed
countermeasures for identified threats. In analysing the risk
to the communication infrastructure, we considered human
assets as a means of exploitation and discovered that the
impacts of the threat from humans are critical to the security
of the communication infrastructure. The classification of
TABLE III
POTENTIAL COUNTERMEASURES TO THREATS
Threats Risk Countermeasure
Eavesdropping and Traffic
analysis
Major 1) Secure transmission of personal and private data via en-
cryption. 2) Implement pseudonyms so that driver, passenger
or vehicle are uniquely unidentifiable.
Message Injection Major Thorough validation of input.
Spoofing Critical 1) Packet inspection. 2) Encryption of transmission medium.
Replay Critical The use of a pseudo-random session token and time-stamp
by means of a secured time synchronization protocol.
Flooding and Spamming Major 1) Implement an intrusion detection system. 2) Use packet
filters to block unwanted traffic.
Blackhole Critical 1) Implement an intrusion detection and prevention system.
2) Use trust based routing protocols.
Jamming Critical 1) Channel switching 2) Track jammers and block them using
a jamming detection device.
Illusion Critical Implement a plausibility validation mechanism for sensor data
verification
Phishing Critical User identity verification via a 2-step authentication procedure
Network Intrusion Critical Use intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms
Sybil Critical 1) Implement a position verification protocol 2) Use digital
signatures and certificate authorities and ensure each network
device has one digital signature and certificate authority
Message suppression Major Ensure that communication channels are encrypted as well as
data transmitted.
Malware Critical a Use intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms (packet
filters)
Masquerade Major 1) Ensure that vehicles have unique and verifiable public keys
(scenario I). 2) Plausibility checks on incoming messages.
Timing Critical Verification of data integrity via cryptographic means to
secure hardware, protect and store data.
Backdoor Critical Use audit-trails to keep track of actions. 2.) if backdoor is
on a hardware device requiring physical access, implement
physical access control and non-repudiation policies.
Repudiation Low Auditing and Logging.
risks for threats identified represents an upper-bound risk
to the autonomous vehicle. The challenge now is expedite
development of apposite security mechanisms to mitigate
threats to facilitate the adoption of the autonomous vehicle
technology.
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